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December 19, 2003

Andy Mitchell’s to-do list

Most Nunavut government officials are shedding no tears this week for Jean Chrétien’s outgoing administration. They view Prime Minister Paul Martin’s ascendancy last Friday as a chance to mend Nunavut’s tattered relationship with Ottawa, and to obtain more tools to help them better the lives of Nunavummiut.

They’re even happier to see the back of Robert Nault, Chrétien’s unpopular minister of Indian and Northern Affairs. Martin removed Nault from cabinet, replacing him with Andy Mitchell, a little-known member of parliament who represents the rural district of Parry Sound-Muskoka, which sits on the southern edge of northern Ontario.

Mitchell, who met Premier Paul Okalik last spring, can be expected to possess at least some knowledge of Nunavut and the other northern territories, having served as secretary of state for parks. The Fenbrook institute, which holds many Inuit inmates serving federal time, is located in Mitchell’s constituency.

But DIAND is a huge, complicated department. Many competing groups, including the Assembly of First Nations and its more than 650 bands will be lining up to present him with their lists of demands. So will the other two northern territories, and a parade of aboriginal organizations. Mitchell’s potential to-do list could be a long one, and even if his intentions toward Nunavut are good, it’s easy to see how Nunavut’s priorities could fall to the bottom of it.

Here then, are our suggestions for which items should sit at the top of Andy Mitchell’s Nunavut to-do list:

• Make a speedy decision on an environmental review for the Bathurst Port-Road Project. This file has languished within the DIAND minister’s office for at least six months. Proponents and opponents of the project alike deserve to know which type of environmental review Ottawa favours — a “Part 5” review conducted by the Nunavut Impact Review Board, or a “Part 6” review conducted by a federal environmental assessment panel.

Environmental groups, along with the Government of the Northwest Territories, favour a federal review of the Bathurst project. The GN and most other Nunavut organizations favour a so-called “made-in-Nunavut” review by the NIRB. Either way, the Bathurst project has been stalled long enough, and even a decision to hold a Part 6 review would be better than no decision at all.

• Start talks on a devolution agreement with the Government of Nunavut. Within the life of the next Nunavut government, at least three new mines — Meadowbank, Jericho, and Hope Bay — are likely to go into production. But the Nunavut government has no means of obtaining revenue from mineral production royalties — only Ottawa can do that. And the Nunavut government has no power over the issuance of exploration and production permits within the territory.

At the very least, Mitchell should appoint a negotiator to work out a framework deal on devolution — a kind of preliminary agreement that would set out what would be covered in a devolution agreement, and a possible timetable. Mitchell should commit himself to achieving a complete devolution agreement for Nunavut by the time the next Nunavut government finishes its mandate. Without such a deal, Nunavut will remain an economic colony of southern Canada.

• Give Nunavut a concrete response to the proposal for a $66-million Canada-Nunavut economic development agreement that the Sivummut group submitted to the federal government a year ago. If a wealthy province like Alberta can benefit from a program like the Western Economic Diversification Fund, then Canada’s most economically depressed jurisdiction, Nunavut, should also get a helping hand from Ottawa.

A well-designed EDA need not degenerate into a patronage-ridden political slush fund. Carefully targeted EDA contributions could be used for a variety of useful purposes, such as helping the Baffin Fisheries Coalition buy a deep-sea fishing vessel.

• Show more flexibility in talks aimed at a new 10-year implementation agreement for the Nunavut land claims agreement — especially the GN-NTI demand for millions of dollars a year in training money to implement Article 23. Mitchell should at least attempt to meet NTI and the GN half-way on this issue. With its under-educated population, Nunavut’s need for more vocational training is enormous. JB

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December 12, 2003

How much is that in real jobs?

After the Feb. 16 territorial election, it's a certainty that the Government of Nunavut will continue to revamp its Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti, or "NNI," policy.

It now has a blueprint to follow — contained in the first comprehensive review of the NNI, done by a team of officials from Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. and the GN, copies of which are now in the public domain.

The GN liked the team's recommendations so much that it has already changed the NNI's best-known feature — its bid adjustment formula. Companies listed as local Inuit-owned will now get larger competitive advantages when bidding for Nunavut government contracts.

Will this encourage the growth of Inuit-owned businesses? Will this create more jobs for Nunavut Inuit? Are the social benefits worth the extra costs imposed on government?

Right now, those are impossible questions to answer.

The NNI policy is, essentially, a subsidy program. And it's also an exchange. Under it, the government agrees to pay extra money, if necessary, to subsidize Inuit, local and Nunavut companies. In return, the government hopes to encourage the development of more Inuit-owned and businesses, and more jobs and training opportunities for Inuit workers.

To meet its legal obligations under Article 24 of the Nunavut land claims agreement, the Government of Nunavut has no choice but to develop such a policy — or something close to it. That's an issue that is beyond debate. And in a poverty-stricken region like Nunavut, it's reasonable for government to use its spending power to generate economic growth.

But how many new jobs for Inuit have been created because of the NNI? How many new Inuit businesses have been created? And how much extra money is the territorial government spending because of the policy?

The NNI Policy Comprehensive Review document, tabled in the legislative assembly last week, does not answer those questions. There is no evidence that the NNI policy is a success, and there is no evidence that it is a failure. We just don't know.

The NNI review team did a good, honest job, and it made many useful observations and recommendations. But it did not do a proper cost-benefit analysis of the policy.

The report, for example, tells us that in 2002-03, $16.7 million worth of contracts were subject to NNI adjustments.

But it does not tell us how many new jobs for Inuit have been created. And it does not measure, in real dollars, how much the NNI-generated policy is costing the Government of Nunavut, over and above what the government might otherwise pay.

Because of that, it's not possible to calculate how much each NNI-generated job, or business opportunity is actually costing the territorial government. And, of course, it's also not possible to calculate how much it's helping Inuit.

This is vital information. The NNI is costing public funds that could be spent on numerous other useful social purposes, such as health care, education, corrections, and social assistance. It's also vital to know so that the NNI can be compared to other ways of helping Inuit get business, job and training opportunities - such as tax credits, training and apprenticeship grants, or direct grants to business.

It's not surprising, perhaps, that a lawyer-driven process like the NNI review would produce no economic analysis. With NTI legalists breathing down their necks every step of the way, it's likely that GN bureaucrats are more worried about how their NNI policy might fare in a courtroom than how it might fare on a social and economic balance sheet.

The NNI is a well-intentioned policy. It's probably a good policy. But without concrete economic evidence, it will always be vulnerable to criticism and a source of resentment for cynics. JB

December 5, 2003

'High' crimes and drunken misdemeanors

It was amusing to hear Iqaluit city councillors complain last week about how much time it's taking the RCMP to lay charges against whoever set fire to Nakasuk and Inuksuk schools recently.

Because when you look at the context of ever-rising mayhem and low-level violence within which those crimes occurred, it's a wonder those incidents were even noticed.

It's all laid out in the Iqaluit RCMP detachment's monthly statistical report, which city councillors had in front of them at last week's meeting.

In it, they would have read that 907 incidents of property damage, or mischief, occurred by the end of October this year in Iqaluit. That's up sharply from the 610 incidents of property damage recorded during the same period in 2002.

These incidents range from the minor smashing of doors and vehicle windshields, to recreational arson attempts and late evening rock-throwing parties. The "let's-throw-the-rock-through-the-window" game is a particular favourite among those returning from an evening of cocktails at one of our glittering night-spots.

That probably explains why the Iqaluit Housing Authority goes through about 5,500 square feet of replacement window glass every year - at a cost of $9 a square foot. Some weeks it looks as if certain Iqaluit residents are determined to tear the city's buildings down faster than they can be built.

In Nunavut's boozed-up capital city, the rising property crime rate is just one part of the most reliable indicator we have for the amount of alcohol abuse in Iqaluit - the crime rate.

And in nearly all categories, the crime rate - Iqaluit's most accurate drunk-o-meter - is rising sharply.

Here's a few more examples:

• Disturbing the peace occurrences are up from 700 at the end of October 2002 to 942 at the end of October this year;
• Assaults are up from 418 at the end of October 2002 to 444 at the end of October this year;
• Sexual assaults are up from 45 at the end of October 2002 to 54 at the end of October this year;
• Impaired driving offences are up from 24 at the end of October 2002, to 57 this year.

And so it goes. Overall, the RCMP report 2,107 liquor-related occurrences in Iqaluit by October 2003. Remember, this is a community of less than 6,000 people.

All those numbers represent hundreds of broken lives, broken families and broken bodies. They represent months, and often years of jail time for scores of people. They represent many hundreds, if not thousands of hours worth of employee absences, and the costs imposed on government and private sector employers alike. They represent an incalculable loss of human potential.

To be fair, the people of Iqaluit have been struggling with alcohol abuse for at least three generations. But despite a lot of work by a lot of good people, it just gets worse.

It's clear that all the growth in Iqaluit produced by the creation of Nunavut hasn't helped, but it would be unfair to blame everything on that single event.

Over the past five years, the Government of Nunavut has put a lot of effort into combating another noxious substance that makes people sick and eventually kills them: tobacco.

But at the same time, alcohol abuse and alcohol-related crime has risen every year, especially in Iqaluit. Will the next Nunavut government devote the same attention to alcohol abuse? Only time will tell. JB

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